There is so much in Ken's post to think about, but I want to focus on Baudrillard's idea of simulation. Ken explains, "simulation stands in for reality, this is the order of the counterfeit or of forgery...simulation hides the absence of reality...simulation produces its own reality, as if reality was the consequence of a model that makes possible its production."
As I stated in a comment to Ken's post, I get excited when I see similarities between critical theory and scientific theory (because I'm one of those people who wants them to be compatible), and I think Baudrillard's ideas of simulation are quite similar to those of evolutionary theory and neurophilosophy -- where the general claim is that the brain creates simulations of the environment (both outside and inside the body), and a person interprets these simulations in consciousness as reality.
So for example, let me try to tackle explaining "the self." I'm not sure about Baudrillard specifically, but the other theorists we've been reading (Derrida, Barthes, Foucault, Freud, Lacan, etc.) oppose the idea of a unified, centered self; they oppose Descartes' mind-body dualism (the "ghost in the machine" idea). Instead, they promote this idea of a constructed, decentered, supplemental, plurality of egos.
Applying Baudrillard's ideas of simulation to this concept of self gives us a model for how the "I" gets created: we simulate ("model, replicate, duplicate the behavior, appearance or properties of") our unconsciousness, as well as the environment around us (we use our senses to take in information from the outside), and create a model of who we are and where we are in relation to what's going on. This model of who we are is in constant flux, in constant process of subsitution (since everything around and within us is in constant flux).
However, we perceive this model of self as being the same through time; we have this idea of "I" that is the same "I" now as it was ten years ago. This is an illusion. According to the philosopher Daniel Dennett, it's an illusion created by our brains, a simulation, a story told in which we are the narrator. The reason our brains create this story of an "I" serves evolutionary functions (survival, reproduction, social communication, and overall thriving in an environment).
So it seems that critical theory and scientific/philosophical theory are compatible in this sense. And it makes "me" wonder what I or anything else looks like from a perspective outside the confines of my body...or is perception only possible with a brain and senses? Is simulation the only possible mode of perceiving reality? If so, what is reality? And how much of it is out there (and in here) that we can't perceive.
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4 comments:
Hi Robbie. The problem with Dennett is that he is presenting the "self" as essential, even biological so. For this reason and others, I see these branches of inquiry as wildly incompatible. You describe a self in charge of her own reality (whether or not that reality is an illusion) or realities in almost perfectly Cartesian terms. The self or selves you describe are not supplemental in the radical sense but in the sense of various versions of an original or essential self. It seems you are thinking of "plurality of egos" in the same way, as multiple selves being created by an original, autonomous self (even if we comprehend that "self" as the embodiment of some kind of essential survival instinct). This idea of an evolved self using different selves to survive is the fantasy of the self or the ego supported by, for example, American ego pscyhology as theorized by Lacan. Taking Lacan's theory of the self as an example, think about how profoundly different a self able to experience illusory selves as real selves and utilize them for a variety of real situations is from a self built on a conscious misrecognition of the image as self.
I think this is an interesting comparison, and I am not saying you are not free to believe or to argue for the self according to neuro- philosophy over the self according to Derrida or Lacan or Baudrillard. The problem is not recognizing the differences between them.
Dr. M,
I don't understand how Dennett's idea of self is essential or Cartesian. He says that the self is an illusion; it is a story made up by the brain to make sense of what is going on and to be able to survive and such.
I am not saying that there is an essential self that is in charge of his/her own reality. The only control, I would argue, one has over anything comes from the evolved trait of consciousness (awareness and ability to reflect, think about what's happening now or what might happen in the future, think about thinking, etc.) which is possible only because language has evolved complex enough to support the capacity for consciousness. But this consciousness is not a self, nor controlled by a self. It is comprised of a plurality of egos (among other things), yet is perceived as one, as a self, by the brain's representation of the system of the person (which is the narrative of a self that Dennett talks about).
"I don't understand how Dennett's idea of self is essential or Cartesian."
Because the theory, as you describe it, still posits human consciousness as the source of reality and meaning. Further, it anchors its claims by relying on a pseudo-scientific idea of "the brain" as a biological reality. Whether you call it "the self" or "the brain," you still have this autonomous, untheorized being or entity responsible for driving its own cohesive narrative in the name of "survival."
Even though Dennett might be pointing out that this unity is an illusion created by the brain, he is still arguing for the brain as a transcendent thing that "makes sense" out of the world.
I definitely understand what you're saying, but I feel like I haven't explained Dennett's argument very well. It's misleading to say that the brain is what creates the narrative of the self...the brain is simply the location where all the sensory information comes together and gets integrated. So the brain isn't choosing how to shape the narrative, it is merely reacting based on what information it receives from the rest of the system it is attached to.
The brain is not an entity, and is certainly not transcendent; it has no sense of reality as reality really is. It simply interprets reality in a reactionary way, based on the information it gets; it is more like a computer than an entity or being.
And consciousness is not the source of reality, but the interpretation of reality that is produced by the workings of the brain (and the rest of the system of the body before information gets to the brain). Consciousness is not, in this view, the self by any means; rather, it is almost a side effect of the functioning of the brain (sort of like the epiphenomenalist view, except epiphenomenalists believe consciousness does nothing and serves no purpose). Consciousness may be the closest a person can come to perceiving reality, but it is not the source of reality, simply a representation of a representation (and perhaps there are many other stages of representation)...but the point is that this theory does not posit a Cartesian dualism.
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